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What has shaped the US urban landscape? Probably, different forces
worked at different magnitudes, times and locations. In this paper,
we develop a methodology to disaggregate some of the engines of US
city growth over time and across space. To understand the results, we
propose a visualization approach based on what we term storyboards
which create an intuitive and dynamic narrative on the effect of several
factors of urban success. This allows us to show that the role of growth
engines greatly differs: the rise and decline of manufacturing was very
localized; industrial specialization is counterproductive, particularly
so in the 1990s; service sectors used to be a consumption amenity,
but now serve as a production amenity; and highly educated cities
unambiguously and increasingly attract firms in any part of the US.
We also note that the arguments for our visualization and its lessons
bear implications for vizualization in the social sciences beyond this
particular example.
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Introduction
What makes cities rise and decline? What attracts Americans to some
cities, and drives them away from others? Policy makers, academics
and the general public have tried to understand the engines of city
growth. Yet, one single explanation may not fit all; more likely, some
forces worked in some places, at some times. The purpose of this
paper is to gain insight into which forces of growth were important
at what time. Instead of proposing new forces of city growth, we
propose a novel way to examine explanations of city growth. To that
extent, we combine an economic model with a visual approach that
interprets its output in a structured and intuitive way. This not only
helps to analyze urban growth patterns, but also makes the causes of
urban change more insightful to a non-technical audience.
Over the past decades, the urban landscape has changed sub-
stantially. The overall post-WWII urban growth pattern in the US
shows decline until the 1970s, followed by a resurgence of the city
afterwards. However, Rappaport (2003) shows that the aggregate
changing pattern applied only to a limited group of cities for which
population decline reverses over the period; most cities only experi-
ence either growth or decline. The Midwest attracted workers long
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ago, but cities near US coasts have fared better over the course of last
century. In recent decades, cities like Detroit and Pittsburgh have
seen population losses, while cities especially in the South, like Hous-
ton, Phoenix or San Diego, have dramatically grown. Yet other cities
like New York, San Francisco and Seattle witnessed rapid growth
in the 1990s, after years of sustained decline. Aiming to inform ur-
ban planners, and driven by the desire to understand how to create
and attract jobs, understanding these urban changes in the US has
become a central policy challenge over the last years.
One reason for city growth to vary over space and time is that
jobs in cities change over time. Cities attract people because of their
employment opportunities and productive benefits. Recent evidence
precisely shows that workers become more productive in urban en-
vironments (Combes et al., 2012). Workers in large cities exploit
the scale effects of their industries, thus securing more and better-
paying jobs. Spillovers and pooled labor markets help cities thrive,
and the industrial structure of cities may therefore be a large asset.
Glaeser et al. (1992) show that specialization patterns have played a
large role in urban economic growth. However, technological change
has favored some industries over others, and international sourcing
strategies have put pressure on offshorable jobs (Blinder, 1996). The
manufacturing belt attracted many jobs with its extraordinary rise
(Krugman, 1991; Klein and Crafts, 2012). But its decline into a rust
belt has turned the industries into a liability for the hosting manufac-
turing cities (Flynn and Taylor, 1986), leaving them with low-skilled,
often unemployed, workers. Instead, well-educated workers seem
to have weathered the crises and globalization better. Technologi-
cal changes have reinforced this process by favouring their jobs and
wages over those of the lesser skilled (Autor and Dorn, 2013). Glaeser
and Saiz (2003) show that much of the recent economic and popula-
tion growth of US cities is associated with high-skilled workers.
Although jobs are relevant, they do not determine urban fortune
completely: people also migrate because they like living in some
cities better than in others. As people become more skilled and their
income grows, “quality of living” gains importance and people in-
creasingly seek out the large consumption options and amenities
that cities provide (Glaeser et al., 2001). Cities offer restaurants and
theaters, and a “mix of social partners” to attend them. In particular,
colleges and universities do not only train highly skilled workers,
but also serve as amenities in themselves: parents are attracted to
cities that provide their children with a good education and people
consider living next to more highly skilled individuals a desirable
situation in itself. In addition, highly educated cities see less conflicts,
less crime, and offer more luxury services, leading to a higher overall
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quality of life (Shapiro, 2006). In this respect, Storper and Scott (2009)
point to a causality problem: do highly educated citizens attract yet
more population, or do firms follow highly educated workers, in turn
causing migration for jobs?
In this paper, we employ an economic model to discern the role
of several of the above processes. Essentially, we investigate how
phenomena like manufacturing and educated workers have left their
traces in metropolitan land and labor markets. The most desired land
typically has the highest prices, but we also consider whether work-
ers are willing to take lower wages to live in a certain city, or whether
firms locating in that city are prepared to pay workers higher wages.
By relating different engines of growth to the land prices as well as to
wages, we infer whether the potential growth engine made the city a
more attractive location, and whether it attracted primarily firms or
population. These effects can be calculated over time as well as over
cities, yielding a bulk of results that may not be directly comprehen-
sible.
Our approach to visualize the effects of several engines of growth
helps solve two of the main challenges mentioned above: the issue
of looking only at averages; and the issue of understanding whether
jobs or people cause growth. Firstly, growth is not uniform over time
or space, and graphical displays allow disaggregating these patterns.
This helps to understand, for instance, how large manufacturing sec-
tor has attracted firms to coastal states in the 1980s, and driven them
away from more central cities only some decades later. Secondly, by
visualizing the rent and wage effects, we can discern whether en-
gines of growth have predominantly attracted jobs to a city, followed
by people; or have predominantly attracted people directly. For in-
stance, we show how services were viewed by people as an amenity
worth migrating to in the 1970s but, over time, the share of the ser-
vice economy in a city has grown into a productive asset, attracting
firms rather than people. A large share of college-educated popula-
tion, by contrast, has contributed substantially to productivity in all
US cities after WWII. Our results thus also show the use of our ap-
proach. Manufacturing changes nature from productive asset to push
factor for citizens, and its effects vary by city. By contrast, college
educated citizens seem to play a productive role across the country.
In a more general context, the exercise proposed in this paper can
also be understood within a larger case for the role of visualization
in the Social Sciences. As we demonstrate, visualization is an ideal
tool to take results from sophisticated, mathematically-based analy-
sis and present them in a more accessible and comprehensible way
(Tufte, 1983). In particular, we believe visualization can act as vehicle
to better communicate information to two non-technical audiences:
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policy-makers and other stakeholders such as journalists interested in
understanding economic mechanisms at work in cities and regions;
and students in the classroom who are being introduced to the field
but do not yet have all the analytical toolkit to fully understand the
underlying theories. For the first group, accessing urban research that
would otherwise go mostly unnoticed allows them to have a better
informed view about issues on which they make relevant decisions;
for the second one, visualization allows the student to engage with
ideas and concepts relevant for his education at an earlier stage in
his training, forming a more accurate picture of the real-world in his
mind. This argument in favor of visualization has probably always
been present, but we feel nowadays it is more timely than ever. As
our society and cities move into a more data-centric world (Batty,
2012, Batty and Cheshire, 2012), it is important to ensure larger parts
of the population can interact with some of these methods and re-
sults. Visualization thus can play a key role in bridging these two.
In the following, we first discuss our methodology. Since the un-
derlying economic theory is quite established, we convey the intu-
ition at a level of depth enough to be able to follow the rest of the
paper, but we skip the mathematical apparatus. Section presents
the visualization approach we suggest to display the results of the
model; Section applies it to the main phenomena highlighted by the
literature as drivers of urban growth; and Section concludes with a
reflection on the role of visualization in this endeavour.
Methods
The methodology we employ assumes that engines of growth leave
their traces in the land rents and wages of a city. These land rents
and wages tell us who had the greatest desire (or dislike) to locate
in the city. Land rents typically rise where land is in high demand,
but considered jointly with wages, it can also be inferred whether
businesses or people demand land. This helps identify, for instance,
not only that large manufacturing sectors have made cities desirable,
but also that it was mostly firms that were attracted to cities with
large-scale manufacturing sectors. The spatial patterns in land rents
and wages are sometimes called compensating differentials - because
they reflect how much or little an individual or firm needs to be
compensated to live in one city versus another. Named after Roback
(1982), the methodology is not new (at all), and it has been used
extensively, for instance to gauge the role of migrants (Ottaviano and
Peri, 2006) or the quality of living in cities (Albouy, 2008). The novely
of our paper is that we attempt to break down the aggregate statistic
over space and time, allowing the role of manufacturing to play a
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different role in different cities at different times. Moving beyond an
average statistic, we need visualization to convey our results.
The methodology boils down to examining how the phenomena
of interest (say, a manufacturing sector) affect land values (r) and
wages (w). The manufacturing sector might attract people, because it
means many goods are cheaply locally available. The manufacturing
sector thus exerts a (consumption) amenity effect, and migrants bid
up land prices. However, the manufacturing sector can also affect the
productivity of prospective firms through technological spillovers or
scale effects. If the manufacturing sector improves productivity, firms
bid up land prices to locate in the city.2 2 We use the manufacturing sector as
an example for the sake of illustration,
but clearly, other engines of growth can
substituted here.
To understand whether it is firms or people that bid up land
prices, we need to look at wages. If people like the amenity value
of the manufacturing sector, they migrate to the city with high rents,
prepared to accept lower wages in the city. Rising rents and falling
wages therefore suggest people value the amenity. If it is firms that
bid up the land price in productive location, they can offer higher
wages (and they need to, because workers have no other reason to
migrate to the city). Thus if large manufacturing sectors are associ-
ated with high rents and high wages, the reason for locating in the
city is high productivity. If cities with large manufacturing sectors
typically have high rents and low wages, the reason people migrate
to the city is that the manufacturing sector acts as a consumption
amenity. The opposite is true if rents and wages in manufacturing
cities are low. Land is not desirable but workers stay, taking lower
wages: the large manufacturing sector must be driving away firms,
not people.
The wage and rent effects of a manufacturing sector (or any other
potential growth engine) show it contributes or stops city growth.
These effects can be derived in an economic equilibrium model (e.g.,
Ottaviano and Peri, 2006), but since the results are well established,
we only summarize them:
effect on rents effect on wages type of force
+ + productive amenity
+ - consumption amenity
- + consumption disamenity
- - productive disamenity
Below, we estimate the effects on rents and wages of different
drivers of city growth. Using data from the US census, we run
decadal cross-sectional regressions for US metropolitan areas. To
allow for shocks in one location to affect the land market as well as
the labor market, we run a seemingly unrelated regression. Using X
as a potential engine of growth (like the size of the manufacturing
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sector), we estimate:
log rct = βrtXct + εrct
logwct = βwtXct + εwct,
where the subscript c refers to the city level and t is a time index.
Inferring βˆwtXct and βˆrtXct from the regression gives the estimated
contribution of (e.g.) the manufacturing sector to the rent and wage
level in each individual city in a single year. For a given city, these
contributions can vary over time for two reasons. Firstly, the effect of
manufacturing, β can evolve over time, and secondly the size of the
manufacturing sector X itself can vary over time. Thus, even if the
role of manufacturing grows over time, the effect on the city can fall
if its manufacturing sector is shrinking.
Our dataset stems predominantly from the Integrated Public Use
Microdata Series (IPUMS). There are 281 metropolitan areas in the
sample, and we observe workers in 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010.
We use average wages over all workers in the metropolitan area as a
measure for the metropolitan wage level. For the land prices, we use
the land rents reported by the same workers in the metropolitan area.
We use four prime variables of interest: the size of the manufacturing
sector, the size of the service sector, college education, and industrial
specialization.3 For the manufacturing share, we take the ratio of em- 3 Our survey of urban growth engines
is far from complete. To show the
visualizations, we have focused on
four popular explanations, but other
possibilities include the effects of
physical geography, social capital,
institutions or the creative class (e.g.,
Henderson and Wang, 2007; Florida,
2002).
ployees working in a manufacturing industry to the overall number
of employees. Our education variable takes the metropolitan share of
workers that has had college education or higher. For the industrial
specialization index, we follow convention and calculate the Krug-
man index. It is calculated as K = ∑Ii |bi − b¯i|, where i denotes the
industry (of I industries), bi is the local employment share of indus-
try i and b¯i is the national employment share of industry i. A low
specialization index points to an industrial structure that is very close
to the national average, whereas a higher index indicates relative
specialization.
Visualization approach: a storyboard of urban evolution
The model we have just outlined produces a substantial amount of
raw output that cannot be interpreted in a direct way. In fact, for
every combination of metropolitan area, year and variable, we have
two estimates: one for the effect on rents and a separate one for the
effect on wages. A simple “back-of-the-envelope” count yields 2,810
measures per variable (281 cities by 5 years by 2 coefficients) with
potentially relevant information. Unfortunately, a clear understand-
ing of this output in raw form is beyond the human brain capacity.
Besides, the value of this information resides in the overall patterns
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that can be extracted from them, rather than in an individual analysis
of every coefficient.
We propose a visualization approach that displays all the estimates
and places them in context, allowing for intuitive comparisons and
exploration. The main goal is to organize the model output in a way
that invites the reader to understand it as a story in which alternative
variables play different roles at different moments and places. The
tool we rely on is a figure that represents the evolution of a single
variable across space and time and that we call storyboard. A story-
board is fundamentally composed by two types of plots: snapshots
and transitions. The snapshots are essentially geographical maps
that show the model’s results in a single year. These static pictures
are connected by a transition plot that makes explicit the direction
cities took from one period to the next. Snapshots and transitions
are arranged chronologically, alternating one another, conveying the
idea of time and evolution in a familiar fashion. The result of this is a
figure that, just like a conventional storyboard, displays the sequence
of events that occurred and connects them over time, making explicit
the dynamic nature of the process they aim to portray. Before we in-
troduce the full Figure, let us explain each of the two components in
more detail with an example.
(a) Snapshot
(b) Transition
Figure 1: Elements of a sto-
ryboard plot (Example with
manufacturing in 1970 and 1970
to 1980)
Figure 1 shows the snapshot of manufacturing in 1970. Through-
out this paper, we use the following color coding: green denotes a
role as consumption amenities (rising rents, falling wages); blue rep-
resents production amenities (rising rents, rising wages); disamenities
are reflected in purple for consumption (falling rents, rising wages)
and brown (falling rents, falling wages) for production. The brown
color of the dots thus indicates that this variable acted as a produc-
tion disamenity: firms were driven away from manufacturing-intense
cities. This result fits with earlier results that suggest a decline in
manufacturing after the WWII buildup and 1950s. To denote the
scale of the effect, the intensity of the color as well as the size of the
dots follow the magnitude of the rent and wage effects4 - assuming
4 Strictly speaking, the value for both
dot size and color intensity is a trans-
formation of the length of the vector
that goes from the origin (0, 0) to the
coordinate marked by the rescaled
rent and wage effects (r¯et+1, w¯et+1) =
(ret+1 − ret,wet+1 − wet). The terms rect
and wect are the city-specific predicted
effects on rents and wages, respectively,
of our variable of interest (Xct) in year t
from the regression described in Section
2.
that powerful sources of attraction raise the rents strongly as well.
The map allows us to get an overview of how the intensity of this
effect was distributed over space: for most cities, it is not very large,
and most of the effects concentrate in the North East.
The transition from 1970 to 1980 is displayed in Figure 1. The main
challenge in this plot is to convey the dynamics of cities from one
period to the next. To solve this with a static figure, we borrow a
concept from directional statistics. We summarize the movements
of cities in the two-dimensional space of rent (X-axis) and wage (Y-
axis) effects by displaying, for each city, the vector that connects the
pair of effects from the initial year to that of the following one. The
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attractiveness of this approach is that the direction of the vectors in
this context carries a clear meaning for what happened in a city over
the period analyzed. A joint positive change in the wage effect and
the rent effect indicates a role change towards production ameni-
ties (upper right quadrant, in blue); while a joint negative change in
the wage effect and the rent effect points to production disamenities
gaining relevance (lower left quadrant, brown). A change towards
consumption amenities is associated with lower wage effects but
higher rent effects - in that case, the directional plot points into the
green, lower right quadrant. Increasing wage effects with falling rent
effects are interpreted as a shift towards consumption disamenities
(the upper left, purple quadrant). Equally, the length of the move
also has a clear interpretation in encapsulating the size of the change.
Since we are mostly interested in the direction of change, we stan-
dardize the vectors so the initial pair of coordinates is set to (0, 0) and
the destination coordinate is accordingly rescaled. With the rescal-
ing, the directional plots have no interpretation in the level of wage
and rent effects - the level is represented in the preceding and ensu-
ing map. The directions and size can be compared across different
decades, however; and the directional lines represent the change for
each individual city shown on the maps. It is possible to see that,
although the exact direction for each city differs, the overall trend of
the effect of manufacturing in the period 1970-80 was towards the up-
per right corner of the transition plot, implying that changes towards
a production amenity.
As mentioned, our storyboard is essentially a sequence of snapshots
that show the type of effect of a variable in a given year, concate-
nated by transitions that help understand how cities moved from one
map to the next. Continuing the manufacturing example, Figure 2
contains its storyboard. It begins with the same plots as in Figure 1,
and the following plots can be read exactly in the same way as the
first scatter and transition graphs. Dot size and color intensity in the
snapshots are set according to a global scale for the entire Figure, so
that it is possible to make comparisons over time across maps of the
same variable. Looking at the map for 1980, as anticipated by the first
transition, the manufacturing sector has turned into a production
amenity, acting thus as an attraction factor. This holds especially for
the North East, but cities around the Great Lakes in 1980 also benefit
from its effect.
The manufacturing sector strengthened its role as a force of at-
traction for firms up to the 1990s, where The North East, the Great
Lakes, Florida and the East coast show strong attraction springing
from the manufacturing industries. Our maps suggest this changed
in 2000: almost all cities saw manufacturing associated with falling
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NOTE: snapshots are color-coded using the following scheme: consumption amenity is green, consumption disamenity is purple,
production amenity is blue and production disamenity is brown.
Figure 2: Manufacturing story-
board - 1970/2010rents but larger wages, suggesting that it was hard to retain workers
- large manufacturing industries have turned into disamenities to
citizens. This is surprising given the large increases of manufactur-
ing productivity growth over that decade, but could be explained by
the accompanying low job growth (BLS, 2012), and changing con-
sumption preferences for environment and services. The intensity
of that effect, however, is not large. The last transition, from 2000 to
2010, shows that the negative role of manufacturing employment
has changed to a production disamenity. Surprisingly, while manu-
facturing growth effects in the 1980s concentrated on the coasts, the
negative effects associated with large manufacturing sectors play out
strongly in the South (Louisiana, Texas).
An alternative visualization that simply plots population changes
requires fewer steps to interpret. However, the current approach of-
fers alternative insights. Based on an underlying statistical model,
it visualizes the attraction that an individual variable (manufactur-
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ing, college education) exerts rather than the variable itself - settting
off our approach from more commonly used direct choropleths. It
also helps understand how that variable contributed to city growth:
whether it attracted firms followed by people, or vice versa. Further-
more, the Figure mixes maps of the level effects with transitional
graphs, combining an understanding of the effects over space and
over time.
Determinants of urban success, visually
The storyboard technique can help convey the results of a complex
economic model in a structured and intuitive way. As argued in the
introduction, urban growth is also determined by many factors other
than manufacturing. In this section, we apply the same approach
to three other variables that have been highlighted by the economic
literature as main determinants of urban growth: industrial special-
ization, college graduates (education), and share of employment in
the service sector. The visual story we are able to tell follows the
main conclusions the economics literature reaches but is also able to
present them in a way that is more compelling and easy to under-
stand.
High industrial specialization (Figure 3) has reduced wages as well
as rents over all years in our sample. This suggests industrial spe-
cialization has predominantly repelled, rather than attracted firms.
This is contrary to Marshallian theories of externalities, but in line
with most empirical literature on industrial scale effects (Glaeser
et al., 1992). The negative effects of specialization are mild in 1970,
but grow worse over the years; in 1980 and especially 1990 some
cities seem to strongly drive away firms based on their specialized
industrial profiles. This effect seems particularly strong in the states
of Washington and California, and around the Great Lakes. This
patterns remains but grows less sharp in 2010. Interestingly, some
commentators have speculated that strongly specialized cities are less
resilient to crisis, but our results do not support that notion (in line
with related literature, Brakman et al., 2014). The strongest effects
play out in 2000 before the 2008 financial crisis, and in 2010, during
a the crisis, the harmful effects of specialization have become milder,
rather than worse.
The nature of education as a growth engine (figure 4) has not
changed much, but its role has become a lot stronger over time. Ever
since 1970, a large share of college educated citizens has functioned
as a productive asset over time. This effect is already very strong
in 1970 and grows in the subsequent decades. Interestingly, even in
1990, the high tide of manufacturing according to our results, the
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NOTE: snapshots are color-coded using the following scheme: consumption amenity is green, consumption disamenity is purple,
production amenity is blue and production disamenity is brown.
Figure 3: Industrial specializa-
tion storyboard - 1970/2010effects of education were stronger: increasing the shares of manufac-
turing employment and college degrees by one standard deviation
yields similar wage effects, but the rent effect of college degrees was
about three times as high (a 46 vs. 18 % points increase). The po-
tential of an educated workforce is no secret to most policymakers
(Glaeser and Saiz, 2003, were seminal for a large literature), but our
results show these effects to be large in comparison. In contrast to
our manufacturing employment results, there are no clear spatial de-
lineations to the role of education - no area really stands out, and the
transition dynamics shows fairly similar changes, suggesting the ef-
fects of educated populations grew alike in most cities. This contrasts
intuition and some other results, suggesting that cities like Boston
and the Northeast to have benefitted most from high education levels
(Glaeser, 2005).
The forces of attraction from the service sector (Figure 5) show
a clear change over time. In the 1970s, a larger service sector func-
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NOTE: snapshots are color-coded using the following scheme: consumption amenity is green, consumption disamenity is purple,
production amenity is blue and production disamenity is brown.
Figure 4: College storyboard -
1970/2010tioned as a consumption amenity, attracting migrants rather than
firms. This role is reinforced in the 1980s where, in all cities, the
service sector moves into the direction of a consumption amenity
even further. However, by 1990, services become an interest of firms,
moving into the domain of production amenities (for some cities
rent effects fall slightly; indicating a transition towards consumption
disamenities, although the net effect remains a production amenity
because the rent effects were large to start with). The change from
green dots in 1980 to blue dots in 1990 indicates an unambiguous
move to production amenities, and this pattern persists into 2000. In
2010, the patterns fades somewhat due to falling rents, although the
net effect of services is still a production amenity at the end of our
sample. Thus, interestingly, the service sector no longer predomi-
nantly serves as an amenity to migrating citizens, but attracts firms.
Possibly, the growth of financial services is reflected in these data,
which directly causes higher wages and rents, but also facilitates lo-
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NOTE: snapshots are color-coded using the following scheme: consumption amenity is green, consumption disamenity is purple,
production amenity is blue and production disamenity is brown.
Figure 5: Service storyboard -
1970/2010cal credit (Greenwood and Scharfstein, 2013). Another possible expla-
nation is that the service sector has changed nature from supplying
final products to serving other businesses. This would coincide with
increasingly fragmented production chains. However, this fragmenta-
tion seems to occur less within the US, suggesting that service-sector
associated jobs could be on the rise due to imports and offshoring of
other steps in the supply chain (Fally, 2011). The latter also coincides
with the largest productive amenities located on the coasts.
Conclusion
This paper visualizes the role of several engines of city growth in
the US. After WWII, large manufacturing sectors formed a source
of attraction for firms, especially by the coasts. More recently, how-
ever, the presence of large manufacturing employment seems to
have lost its productive edges, particularly driving away firms in the
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South. Industrial specialization seems to have played a negative role
during the entire period analyzed and throughout the geography,
mainly deterring firms from locating there. The presence of a large
service sector was considered a consumption amenity in the 1970s
and 1980s, but switched to productive asset in the decades after, at-
tracting firms rather than people. Lastly, the role of eduction has
grown over the last half century. While to some, an educated pop-
ulation may be a motive to migrate to a city, our results show that
educated workforces primarily attract firms. Not only is the effect of
a college-educated workforce growing over time, it is increasingly a
productive asset to the city. Engines of growth change over time, but
also over space: manufacturing changes from productive asset to con-
sumers’ liability, with place-specific impacts, while higher education
has productive growth effects that are relatively uniform across the
country.
Our visualization approach has two distinct merits, in our view.
Firstly, it is able to uncover more complicated patterns in urban
change. It can make clear not only that manufacturing or educa-
tion was an important engine of growth, but also where and in what
years its impact was large, as well as whether it improved quality of
life or job prospects. This contributes to overcome the “one size fits
all” mantra, common in many policies, highlighting conditions or
circumstances in which cities could attempt to get higher educated
individuals, attract specific industries, or exploit their amenities. Sec-
ondly, in many ways, the representation of the results is more acces-
sible - the storyboard conveys a scenario rather than numbers. Moving
beyond equations and raw regression output enables policy makers,
journalists and other non-technical audiences to better interpret and
engage with these models of urban change at a more complete level.
This has a democratization effect in that it rebalances the status quo
where audiences without significant mathematical background tra-
ditionally had little access to these sorts of results. The storyboard
methodology is an example of an attempt to not only help under-
standing and interpreting scientific results through visualization, but
also of how to multiply the research impact by communicating it to a
wider audience.
While we argue that our approach allows for a more disaggregated
analysis, there are some drawbacks and limitations, too. Firstly, the
approach is exploratory rather than explanatory - it may give new
insights but we have not provided a statistical test of, e.g., the differ-
ences between cities. Therefore we believe our results can provide
ideas for policy design, but not substantiate it statistically. In addi-
tion, as presented here, the approach is not interactive. One could
argue that, given its focus on exploration and discovery, an envi-
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ronment in which the user could interact with the visualization by
zooming in, querying names of cities or estimate values, would be
more powerful. Such an approach could even be further enhanced
by introducing fully linked views: a system where the user could, for
example, select a city in one of the snapshots and its corresponding
line segment in the transition view and the rest of the storyboard was
highlighted as well. Secondly, while the disaggregation is more de-
tailed than a single regression analysis coefficient, it is impossible to
avoid aggregation in some dimension. In our analysis, we have cho-
sen to allow the effect of growth engines to be constant over all cities
in one year - a 10 percentage point increase share of manufacturing
in total employment raises rents and wages by the same percentage,
whether the city is large or small, or manufacturing intense or not.
While arguably manufacturing follows a comparable technology for
all cities same year, we ignore differences in, for instance, the type of
manufacturing or whether cities have ports to ship. Thirdly, the visu-
alization relies on an underlying economic model, which is inevitably
a simplification of reality. There are, of course, instances where wage
and rent changes (or their absence) are not determined by market
forces. In such cases, our results would be biased (Albouy, 2008).
When prices and wages are regulated, it is also hard or impossible
to apply our methodology. A last, fair objection we want to mention
is that we have focused on the visualization, not paying particular
attention to causality. Cities might have features that both attract
manufacturing firms and increase land rents, invalidating a causal
interpretation. We fully acknowledge this issue, but argue that it is
potentially solvable by taking the identification problem into account
in the underlying regression, a modification that would not change
the role of visualization in exploiting its results.
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